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ABSTRACT
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) causes behavioral and emotional problems. The
emotions associated with the disorder, research has shown, literally change and individual’s
perception. Those who study the effects of emotion on perception generally accept an indirect
theory of perception like representationalism. Yet, an indirect theory does not seem to be
adequate to account for the immediacy and phenomenology of PTSD. Therefore, a theory that
can better account for these is needed. I suggest a form of direct realism – the combined
scientific-philosophical theory that combines John Campbell’s 3-place relation and James J.
Gibson’s direct perception of information through ambient light – is such a theory. In addition,
looking at the variability of normalcy may account for why there is not 100% attrition of PTSD
across individuals exposed to the same or similar traumatic events.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There exists a condition that is widely recognized throughout psychology, as well as by
the general public, known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The commonly accepted
view is that PTSD causes behavioral and emotional problems that lead to relationship and other
social interactional dysfunctions. What is not commonly purported is that PTSD may actually
change the way the sufferer perceives the world such that emotions associated with the
experiences that culminate into the condition of PTSD have literally changed the individual’s
perception.
In recent years research has shown definitively that emotions literally and effectually
augment perception. Augmented perception for PTSD, given that there is not a 100% attrition of
the disorder across individuals exposed to the same or similar traumatic events, suggests that
there might exist a sliding scale of perceptual normalcy (SSPN) for individuals that perpetuates
and adjusts throughout one’s experiential life. Psychologists who have studied the effects of
emotion on perception have deeply embedded philosophical theories pertaining to perception,
specifically how we perceive the world and what precisely we perceive, which they tend to
overlook, ignore, or take for granted. The elucidation of a more precise theory of the world as we
experience it may offer some insight into how one might better understand and possibly treat
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PTSD. I will argue that a direct theory of perception is needed to account for interactions with
the physical world that prompt emotion, which in turn augment perception.
I will begin with a description of PTSD and what research has shown regarding the
effects of emotion on perception, firmly establishing that emotion augments perception. I will
follow this with an expansive look at the altered view of the world experienced by PTSD
sufferers. With an altered view established I will point out why a direct realist account is needed
and address a typical challenge. Combining the theories of John Campbell and renowned
psychologist James J. Gibson, I will argue that such a theory withstands the challenge and fully
accounts for the way in which PTSD sufferers experience the world. Finally, I will point out that
a direct realist theory of perception is needed to account for the immediacy and phenomenal
characteristics of PTSD and, combined with an understanding of the sliding scale of perceptual
normalcy, might have profound implications for the treatment of PTSD.

2

CHAPTER 2

PTSD

The nomenclature and nosology of the anxiety disorder presently referred to as PTSD has
changed many times over the years but has been included in every edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM): as gross stress reaction (DSM-I, 1952), transient
situational disturbance (DSM-II, 1968), and post-traumatic stress disorder (DSM-III, 1980 and
forward).1 Prior to its appearance in the DSM, the condition was referred to as shell shock,
combat neurosis, and battle fatigue. The militaristic labels of the noted condition resulted from
the preponderance of military personnel who had been in combat situations, experienced the
same or similar trauma, and reported similar associative problems. It was not until DSM-III
(1980), and only through the specific focus of the Reactive Disorders Committee, that the
multitude of previous research, which had been guided by various frames of reference by many
different researchers, was synthesized into a criteria for diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder: “development of characteristic symptoms following a psychiatrically traumatic event
that is generally beyond the realm of normal human experience.”2 Such trauma is clearly not
limited to combat experiences.

1

Philip A. Saigh and J. Douglas Bremner, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Comprehensive Text (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1999), pg. 1-17.
2
Ibid, 5.
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What Constitutes PTSD?
There are seven (7) criteria that must be satisfied in order for an individual to be
diagnosed with PTSD according to the most recent edition of the DSM (DSM-5, 2013). These
criteria explicitly delineate the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for PTSD: how one
experiences the traumatic event, the intrusive symptoms, avoidance behaviors, alterations in
cognition or mood, and alterations in arousal or reactivity that must be present for longer than
one month. The symptoms must also cause significant social or other dysfunctions and must not
be due to medication, alcohol or previously existing medical condition. There is no one scenario
that is paradigmatic of a case of PTSD.

What Is PTSD Like?
For our purposes let us first examine the experiential nature of PTSD. Having been
exposed to the types of trauma that could potentially lead to PTSD, those beyond the realm of
normal human experience, it is unsurprising that the PTSD sufferers’ concept of normalcy is
altered. They are likely to have nightmares, experience random, seemingly unprovoked moments
of severe sadness or hypervigilance, or become introverted to the point of agoraphobia; the range
of possibilities is vast.
A study of children displaced as a result of the Russio-Finnish War (1939-1940),
conducted by Bradner (1943), reported that “even a year after the war, the sight of ruins had a
profoundly depressing effect upon the children… war films, saddening war pictures in illustrated
magazines, reports of war of any kind still caused such symptoms of wartime to return at any
given moment.”3 These places and artifacts, though correlated and associated through cognitive
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Ibid, 3.
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processing to completely different places and artifacts, symbolize the sorts of objects in the
world that are known to the observer to have a certain connotation associated with them.
Another study, of German concentration camp survivors, conducted by Etinger (1962),
revealed that “subjects experienced ‘painful associations’ that could occur in ‘any connection
whatsoever, from seeing a person stretching his arms and associating this with his fellow
prisoners hung up by their arms under torture, to seeing an avenue of trees and visualizing long
rows of gallows with swinging corpses.’”4 This observation might lead one to suspect that what
is at work are mental images, but what seems to point to something starkly different are the
‘painful associations’ with ‘any connection whatsoever’. A connection is exactly what these
survivors had. The information, which included their physical and psychological standpoint,
triggered the painful associations upon inspection of the environment that rendered similar
information.
Still, the question of this section remains; what is PTSD like? One typical way of
thinking of a PTSD experience is that of flashbacks. The sufferer experiences intrusive memories
that place her in the moment of the traumatic event and, in serial fashion, she re-experiences the
events in the present as if she were in the past. The connection between past and present has to
do with the incorporation of time with the stimulus information in both the logical and
phenomenal experience as it relates to the past. Often, however, when a PTSD sufferer is in the
state of processing a traumatic memory it is less like a flashback and more like a flash-forward of
the past experience into their present state of awareness. Though it is impossible to look inside
the mind of another and see their mental state for any given experience, an analysis of this sort of
experience might offer some clarity.

4

Ibid,.
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In the moment of being overtaken by the traumatic memory the experiencer is
simultaneously experiencing: 1) the trauma of the past, 2) the present state of experiencing the
present time and place, and 3) the present state of experiencing the present time while also
experiencing 4) the memory of the past, which involves experiencing 5) the trauma anew at least
in part if not in full. The PTSD sufferer also has, built into this experience of the traumatic
memory, both the past and the present, which is further complicated as the experience of, “pastas-past… past-as-present… and present-in-reference-to-past and present-in-reference-to-past-aspresent.”5
The following scenario is an attempt to explain what such a convoluted memory might be
like for a PTSD sufferer. I do not suggest that this example adequately conveys the full
experience, as it would be for the sufferer. This is merely an attempt to place the process
memory in a context.
Pat arrives to find no one home (2015). She is overcome by the memory of her exhusband kidnapping their kids and hiding them for several months (2012). She tries to call her
husband, but no one answers (2012). The police come to her house and inform her that she
cannot report the children missing at that time (2012). She frantically calls her husband; he says,
“Hello,” (2015/2012) several times, but his voice sounds foreign (2015). She says, “Where are
my kids!?!” (2015/ 2012). Her husband says, “We’re at my mom’s” (2015), while the words of
her ex-husband, “You’ll never see ‘em again” (2012), resound clearly in her mind. She hangs up
the phone and sits in the floor with various parts of the three-month ordeal from 2012 – not
knowing where or how her children were or if she would see them again and when – randomly
bursting into her mind (2015). She is simultaneously in the past, in the present, and in the present
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Mary Jeanne Larrabee, "The Time of Trauma: Husserl's Phenomenology and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,"
Human Studies 18, no. 4 (1995): pg. 357, accessed June 30, 2015.
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affected by the past, as well as helpless in the past, and the past as present, as a result of being in
the present.
Memory is clearly a proponent and/or product of the survival instinct for humans,
although it seems, at least for the PTSD sufferer, that traumatic memories, though they satisfy
the necessary goal of alerting the experiencer to potential threats, have the added effect of
diminishing the quality of life of the PTSD sufferer due to the overwhelming, convoluted effect
the process has on the individual. Feeling the interactions between the objects of the world in
both present and past, in the full-bodied sense that is encapsulated in the memory of interlacedinformation stored, undoubtedly has such an overwhelming effect.

What Precipitates PTSD?
The basis for PTSD being the experience of a traumatic event beyond the realm of
normal human experience suggests and requires that there is some generally accepted state of
‘normal’ for all experiencers. Research regarding PTSD consistently uncovers a “dose response
relationship between the severity of exposure to trauma and the onset of PTSD.”6 What is normal
for one would not necessarily be normal for others but, varying only by degrees, there must be
some such state that we can call the range of normal even if only for the individual. It appears
that perception, affected by emotion in a real-time real-world way must have some basis of
normalcy. This basis of normalcy is likely rooted in our genetics and is developed as the
individual develops throughout childhood and adolescence through nurturing, education, and
individual experiences. I suggest that the level of normalcy one establishes in youth and
adolescence is the level they carry with them into adulthood, which, therefore, precipitates their

6

Matthew J. Friedman, "Phenomenology of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Acute Stress Disorder," Oxford
Handbooks Online, 2008, pg. 70, accessed June 30, 2015.
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reaction to and perception of future experiences as normal, abnormal, and traumatic. Stockholm
syndrome7 and other psychological phenomena clearly illustrate how one’s sense of normalcy
can be altered.
The variableness of what is normal for the subject on this view can be represented by
what I refer to as the Sliding Scale of Perceptual Normalcy (SSPN). This is not altogether
dissimilar with how psychologists characterize what they call trait-anxiety; one’s level of traitanxiety is responsible for the modulation emotion affects on attention.8 The obvious difference
being that trait-anxiety is focused on a person’s tendency to be predisposed to a certain level of
anxiety for any given situation. The SSPN, on the other hand, points to the standing variable
state of normalcy for any given individual at the moment of exposure to traumatic events or
situations, not just how likely they are to see something as sad or happy. When one’s natural
exposure to trauma is greater, the likelihood of PTSD onset is greater. I propose that one’s base
of experience (one’s norm) and the severity of the trauma (its life-threatening capacity as well as
its distance from the experiencer’s norm) can be directly associated with one’s tendency to
develop PTSD.
Based on the SSPN, one’s state of normalcy, if the traumatic event or situation
experienced is drastic enough, can precipitate a constant state of PTSD throughout the remainder
of one’s life. Likewise, if one’s state of normalcy is benign enough, experiencing the trauma of
rape or combat could take their perceptual acuity beyond any conceivable sense of normalcy,
such that the experiencer’s life becomes intolerable.
7

“Stockholm syndrome is considered a complex reaction to a frightening situation… [with] three central
characteristics: * The hostages have negative feelings about the police or other authorities./* The hostages have
positive feelings toward their captor(s)./* The captors develop positive feelings toward the hostages.” In addition to
this definition it is important to note that Stockholm Syndrome is not included in any edition of the DSM.
“Stockholm Syndrome,” Farlex Partner Medical Dictionary, accessed March 28, 2016, (http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Stockholm+syndrome).
8
Emma Ferneyhough et al., "Anxiety Modulates the Effects of Emotion and Attention on Early Vision," Cognition
& Emotion 27, no. 1 (2013): pg. 8, accessed June 30, 2015.
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CHAPTER 3

AN ALTERED PICTURE OF THE WORLD: EMOTION, ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION

It seems obvious to state that the things one perceives have the ability to create various
emotional states. How objects in the world are capable of acting on mental states (i.e. emotional
states) seems less obvious. The mind/body problem aside, there is no doubt a direct relation
between mental states and physical responses (e.g. physical reactions to mental states), which
would suggest the reverse is likely as well. Research has shown that individuals forming the
facial expressions associated with sadness or anger inadvertently feel sad or angry.9 The
physical, in such cases, is directly acting on the mental.
Concomitantly, the sight of a dog (a beloved pet) being ran over by a car will create a
deep sense of sadness and compassion in experiencers to the point of sending some to the local
animal shelter to adopt a pet. Others might be severely angered by the site of a young person
racing their vehicle through an intersection and nearly hitting an elderly person who is trying to
cross. The opposite being the case – emotion changing how and what one perceives – escapes the
grasp of many who study emotion or perception. This could be because many who study these
fields, both in psychology and philosophy, do so in isolation. Even to those who study
perception, it is generally thought of as strange to consider that emotion can and does alter
9

Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1995), pg. 127. Importantly, there was no visual perception in this study. The research did not
involve mirrored responses and the subjects were not aware that the facial expressions they were told to emulate
were those generally associated with any particular emotions.
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perception.10 Nevertheless, there are those who have endeavored to study the effects of emotion
upon perception. From these studies some very important claims and discoveries have been
advanced.
Emotion primes the visual system for the purpose of self-preservation or well-being and
is responsible for drawing the experiencer’s attention toward threatening stimuli or causes one to
be slow to disengage.11 Accepting such a claim still seems less radical than to claim, “emotion
actually affects how people see.”12 Both of these statements point to the discoveries that emotion
and likewise attention have an effectual relationship with perception. The specifics of the studies
are not cursory. They point to the very realistic augmentation of what and how one perceives as a
result of sadness, anxiety, happiness, and anger.
The state of alarm brought on by the belief that something in one’s purview might, or
most likely could, cause harm or render a negative situation rather than a positive one would
strike no one as odd or in need of discovery. Most of us, including psychologists and
philosophers, are aware and acceptant of a survival mechanism that renders us capable of
avoiding fire, a falling tree limb, or an erratic driver without some special process that makes us
see these objects differently than people not in the same situation. Yet, even these basic,
momentary instances show that emotions have direct effects on what we perceive. These
reactionary instances may not affect higher-order perception such that overall perception is
augmented but there is a clear tendency to avoid those things that we perceive as likely to cause a
negative outcome and to be drawn to those things that are most likely to create a positive
outcome.
10

Jonathan R. Zadra and Gerald L. Clore, "Emotion and Perception: The Role of Affective Information," Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science WIREs Cogn Sci 2, no. 6 (2011): np, accessed July 27, 2015.
11
Ibid. Zadra and Clore actually write “in the interest of minimizing negative and maximizing positive outcomes.”
12
E. A. Phelps, S. Ling, and M. Carrasco, "Emotion Facilitates Perception and Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits of
Attention," Psychological Science 17, no. 4 (2006): pg. 4, accessed June 30, 2015.
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Emotion Augments Perception and Attention
The amygdala – the portion of the brain responsible for feelings, visual learning and
memory – is thought to respond automatically to effective stimuli, and seems to be dependent on
relevance for its reaction.13 One particular study showed that the amygdala only responded to the
names of individuals that the subject liked for the positive aspect of the study and only to the
names of disliked people for the negative aspect of the study, which seems to suggest that highand low-levels of the brain are constantly interacting, making it seem at least likely that emotion
affects perception.14 Perspective is undoubtedly affected by emotion. Though this may not
directly show that perception is augmented, there is a definitive change. The narrowing of
viewpoint under stressed conditions could be seen as a survival mechanism. People who are
stressed tend to see things more narrowly whereas those experiencing positive emotions see
things more broadly: the forest or the trees analogy.15 Humans have a tendency to focus on
things in a broad (global) sense, but often times there are situations that bring about a need or a
desire to process more specifically, or locally.
Survival would seem to be arbitrated more by dangers than opportunities, as it is only
when dangers are avoided that opportunities are possible. Fear and sadness are motivating
emotions and can cause the experiencer to see threats more readily or seek out change. It has
been proposed, and findings have supported the notion, “that stress narrows attention [and]
positive emotion broadens attention.”16 In a simplistic way, a tendency to process information
locally or globally can be thought of in the general context of attending a party. When you walk
in – provided it’s a party that you are comfortable being at and believe there to be a general
13

Jonathan R. Zadra and Gerald L. Clore, "Emotion and Perception: The Role of Affective Information," Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science WIREs Cogn Sci 2, no. 6 (2011): np, accessed July 27, 2015.
14
Ibid,.
15
Ibid,.
16
Ibid,.
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acceptance of your presence – you notice the vastness of the room and all those in attendance
and you do not focus on any particular individual, at least at the outset. Later, during the party
you find yourself speaking to another or to a few in a small group, but given the general
congenial nature of all those in the room and those in your group you hear the music as well as
distant chatter intermittently with the conversations between yourself and the individual or small
group with which you have attached yourself. Then, someone brandishes a pistol. And, it seems
that no one has noticed the gun except you. Instantly, instinctively, your processing becomes less
global and more fixated on the person with the pistol, locally focusing on the person’s body
language, trying to determine the purpose of his brandishing the pistol – whether or not the pistol
is real, if the wielder intends to fire it, and many other possible considerations. The stress of
seeing the gun can also be amplified by past experiences with individuals wielding weapons in a
crowded room or otherwise. The emotions that you might have associated with guns are what
causes the narrowing of your purview. Studies have shown that “fear and anxiety bias attention
toward threatening stimuli.”17 The enjoyment of the party and present company is thereby set
aside or even displaced by the more narrow view of the pistol.
An experiment was conducted, testing the responses of subjects who were unaware of the
intent of the study, by having them focus on a central point on a screen and showing various
images of Gabor patches of differing contrasts, intermittently with fearful and neutral faces, both
right-side-up and upside-down. Results showed that “the level of contrast needed to perform the
orientation discrimination task was lower when the stimuli were preceded by a fearful face than
when they were preceded by a neutral face… the mere presence of a fearful face heightened
contrast sensitivity,” which offered the first demonstrative evidence that “emotion actually

17

Ibid,.
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affects how people see.”18 A second experiment focused on emotional interaction with attention
also showed that the presence of a fearful face heightens ones sensitivity to contrast. Anyone
who has found themselves walking in unfamiliar territory and has seen something out of the
corner of their eye that they identified as a potential danger will be familiar with this effect. Fear
has possibly a stronger effect on perception than any other emotion because it initiates our fight
or flight response.
A supporting study showed that not only can emotion enhance and improve attention and
perception it can also impair them.19 The benefits and costs were assessed based on the speed of
processing as opposed to merely measuring the benefits of contrast sensitivity in the previous
study by Phelps et al. What it showed was that anxious individuals are drawn more to threatening
stimuli or are slow to disengage from dangerous or threatening stimuli than those who are less
anxious.20 It is also shown by this study that an individual’s sensitivity to contrast is not only
affected in a controlled way, but that the effect on attention is based on the individual’s level of
tendency towards anxiety. An individual’s trait-anxiety pre-determines their disposition to
engage or ability to disengage from fearful faces. This has implications regarding the SSPN as
well.

Implications of Augmented Perception
The information gathered in these and other specifically focused research experiments
show definitively that emotion has a direct effect on what and how one perceives. Not only is the
observer’s assessment of the world altered but his focused attention is also impacted. If we link
18

E. A. Phelps, S. Ling, and M. Carrasco, "Emotion Facilitates Perception and Potentiates the Perceptual Benefits of
Attention," Psychological Science 17, no. 4 (2006): pg. 1, accessed June 30, 2015.
19
Emma Ferneyhough et al., "Anxiety Modulates the Effects of Emotion and Attention on Early Vision," Cognition
& Emotion 27, no. 1 (2013): pg. 1, accessed June 30, 2015.
20
Ibid, 6.
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this information back to the phenomenological assessment of how a PTSD sufferer experiences
the world in §2.2, there is little doubt that someone with PTSD sees the world drastically
different from anyone else.

14

CHAPTER 4

WHY WE NEED A DIRECT REALIST ACCOUNT

Accepting all that the evidence suggests, why then do we need a direct realist account of
perception? Much of the scientific world generally accepts something like representationalism in
regards to perception. The theory suggests that all that observers are directly aware of are their
internal representations. Considering the research and evidence for emotionally augmented
perception there appears to be immediacy in perception; objects in the world appear to have a
direct link with observers and not merely a causal link. There is information being transmitted
and picked up on in a direct way that does not depend on cognitive processing or internal
representations. The information, rather, is what the cognitive processing or internal
representations are about. This suggests that a direct theory is needed to account for our
immediate interaction with the world. But, let us first take a brief look at an indirect theory like
representationalism in order to frame the juxtaposition.

Representationalism: A Brief Overview
The terms associated with representationalism, and direct realism for that matter, are used
in many different ways throughout philosophy and even in psychology. My usage of these terms
may not directly line-up with the way that others use them, but for my purposes my usage
represents the way in which I understand these theories.
15

There is a sense in which a representationalist theory seems consistent with, and perhaps
even supported by, emotionally augmented perception. Perception is the product of cognitive
processing of internal representations that are caused by the objects and their features in the
external world. Representationalists differ, however, on whether what one perceives is the
representational vehicle (the non-representational features of internal representational states), its
representational contents, or some sense of both. Nevertheless, the suggestion is that observers
can only know their interpretations (i.e. mental representations) or ideas of the way the world is
because there is no direct connection with the world, only a causal link. On this notion we can
only infer objects in the external world based on our internal theories of the objects, though they
may be altogether quite different.

Representationalism Gets The Phenomenology Wrong
Representational theories of perception cannot escape the disconnect their theories create
between objects and observers. They equate perceptual experience to mental processing of causal
stimuli. This way of thinking focuses the problem squarely with the sufferer and detaches the
problem from objects in the world and the experiences associated with them; and, therefore, does
not give an adequate account of emotionally augmented perception as it is experienced by PTSD
sufferers. For PTSD sufferers the phenomenology is the experience. Husserl’s notion of telos
suggests that human subjectivity is fundamentally changeable such that a PTSD sufferer could
reprocess original traumatic experiences to fit current situations both serially and nonserially, as
explained in §2.2. One sort of what Husserl calls temporalizing – flashbacks – requires one to
view memory as a process. By presupposing an encoded process rather than merely contents as
representationalism suggests, it can be accepted that one can re-process a past process in a
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different way and thereby recreate the past. This sort of processing affects the whole person
making it more than just a mental experience.21 A flashback, however, is serial in nature and
follows the course of action of the original experience.
Whereas flashbacks occur serially as a replay of events in a chronological-type fashion,
the nonserial experience is quite complicated. The memory associated with it varies from serial
to non-serial, the content of the memory varies from representational to process memory, and it
also fluctuates from simple to complex in its detail.”22 Based on passive associations, a PTSD
sufferer can encounter something in present time that their consciousness associates with
something in the past that activates appropriate behaviors without the sufferer being actively
involved or aware.23 PTSD can activate a conscious response without the individual being
actively involved in their behavioral changes. This seems to be directly related to basic survival
and shows how one’s emotional state can alter one’s behavior and responses to their
environment, implying that they see the world physically different.
Even though part of the content of the phenomenal effect that PTSD sufferers experience
is representational, the representationalist theory of what is being experienced does not seem up
to the task of accounting for the full sense of the experience. To view perception as
representational content – detached from relevance to actual objects of association in the world –
oversimplifies the situation at the risk of failing to understand what is actually going on for the
PTSD sufferer. A slideshow of representational content seems unlikely to produce such an effect.
Furthermore, the notion of objects having a causal effect seems difficult to account for if there is
no direct connection between objects and the observer.
21

Mary Jeanne Larrabee, "The Time of Trauma: Husserl's Phenomenology and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,"
Human Studies 18, no. 4 (1995): pg. 353, accessed June 30, 2015.
22
Ibid, p. 355-56. She notes that she is “expanding on Husserl’s theory of memory, pursuing both implication of his
texts and the results of experiential reflections.”
23
Ibid, 358. Causes of this sort are referenced in §2.2. and §6.1 of this paper.
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Representationalism Gets Cognitive Immediacy Wrong
On the representationalist view, the visual system seems to exist and work for the
purpose of creating an image – a representation – of the environment that may be but most likely
is not accurate. The associations for PTSD should not be seen as simply mental processes that
only exist in the mind having only an initial causal relationship with things in the world. Doing
so suggests that the problem is with the sufferer and thus removes the objects and experiences
associated with those objects, with which the sufferer has emotive associations, from perception.
Part of what we ‘see’ is the opportunities for and costs of acting on the environment. For
example, the ground is perceived relative to its walkability and to the bioenergetic costs
that this action would incur. However, these nonvisual influences are not limited to
energy-related factors: emotions too are a source of nonvisual information that affects
visual perception. Moreover, the influences of such nonvisual information generally
appear oriented toward such beneficial consequences as conserving energy, attaining
goals, or avoiding danger.24
Emotion plays an intimate role and affects what one perceives, how one perceives it, the
way in which attention is valued more for certain levels of trait-anxiety, and literally augments
what one sees. Though it may be tempting for the representationalist to argue that since emotion
takes place in the mind that emotionally augmented perception supports a representational theory
of perception; this would be assuming too much. We do not perceive retinal images; a notion to
which most representationalists are committed. Rather, perception is direct and unmediated.25 If
there were such a retinal image it would be one that could never be interpreted given the circular
and constantly changing function of our vision.

24
25

Zadra and Clore, "Emotion and Perception: The Role of Affective Information," np.
Gibson, “A Theory of Direct Perception,” 88.
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Why Direct Realism is more Attractive
Representationalism seems unable to account for the phenomenology and immediacy that
PTSD requires by suggesting that all that observers are directly aware of are their internal
representations. If perception is merely caused by objects there is difficulty in explaining
encoded process memory whereby one not only remembers but also re-experiences the past in
the present. Though representationalism may seem to be applicable for the notion of emotion
augmenting perception since, on the representationalists view, perception is only of
representational content; it has the consequence of suggesting, in circular fashion, that emotions
about representational content affect representational content. To suggest that emotions have an
effect on representational content within the brain would be to suggest that there is a sort of
double-perceiving in play (a second-order property whereby a lower-level property realizes a
higher-level property within the brain).26 There is no evidence for any such circular- or doubleperceiving. To take this one radical step further there is no little man, or eye, anywhere in the
head or the brain to perform this double-perceiving.27 The fallacy for indirect visual perception is
that it substitutes pictures for things. Therefore, what is needed is a theory that can account for
the intimacy and immediacy with objects in the world that is required when one attempts to
account for PTSD.
A direct realist theory of perception that can account for the phenomenal experience of
PTSD and the immediacy in perception, can also better explain how memory is encoded with
physical, spatial, auditory, and temporal information that could be re-experienced. It can also
account for similarity in perception, whereas the privacy of internal representations cannot.
John Searle offers the following argument against representationalism:

26
27

Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, pg. 163-64.
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1) Assume that humans successfully communicate at least some of the time.
2) Assume the form of communication consists of publicly available meanings in a
public language.
3) For (2) we must assume publicly available objects of reference.
4) Therefore, humans who successfully communicate must share perceptual access to
the same object.28
Searle adds, “a public language presupposes a public world. The problem, then, with
[representationalists] is that the privacy… is inconsistent with a public language about a public
world.” 29
It seems that “the right idea has to be that there is only one thing for receptors to respond
to – reality.”30 Direct realism as a theory of perception has this right idea as its basis. More
importantly, direct realism draws its standards for truth and justification from reality. There are
things in the world and we perceive them. Epistemologically speaking, “one begins directly in
contact with reality and builds from there.”31 The builds from there, though, is generally thought
of as a challenge for direct realism. As I will show in the next section, John Campbell’s notion of
standpoint can account for this challenge.
Direct realism adequately and simply accounts for the effects of emotion on perception as
well as the encoded information in memory for PTSD sufferers. It is therefore a more adequate
theory of perception for the evidence given and the way we encounter the world. Indirect
theories like representationalism are not compatible with this evidence or the phenomenology
associated with memories that occur as either serial or nonserial processes.
28
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CHAPTER 5

COMBINING CAMPBELL AND GIBSON: A SCIENTIFIC-PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF
DIRECT REALISM

Direct realism as a theory of perception is quite simplistic. So simplistic in fact that many
are often tempted to dismiss it as no more than a version of naïve realism – the common sense
theory that our senses provide us direct access and awareness to the external world. An argument
for this common sense view would look something like:
1) There exists a physical world of objects.
2) Objects can be known through sense-experience.
3) These objects persist, as do their properties, even when not being perceived, making
them largely independent of perception.
4) Our senses perceive the world directly, just as it is.
There are a multitude of historical objections that adequately indicate this theory is not
sufficient to account for all we perceive. Naïve as this theory may appear it does not contain a
false premise. It is merely too simplistic to withstand challenges. Nevertheless, it is not the
theory of perception that I endorse. I advocate a theory that combines the philosophical theory
put forth by John Campbell and the notion of direct perception advocated by renowned
psychologist James J. Gibson. The result is a direct realist theory of perception that is
information-based and that adequately accounts for the immediacy, phenomenal experience, and
21

process memory apparent in PTSD. It also accounts for emotionally augmented perception in a
way that is consistent with the phenomenology of the PTSD sufferer’s experience. The notion of
similarity, which cannot be accounted for by internally private theories such as
representationalism, is also explained.

Campbell’s Version of Direct Realism: A Three-Place Relation
The typical view, as explained above in the naïve realist case, is a two-place relation
between and observer and an object. Campbell establishes that there is a third place; a
standpoint.32 Standpoint, as Campbell describes it, is a general term that points in an obvious
way to a location in time and space from which the observer views the particular object; physical
standpoint. An observer stands in relation to an object and must view the object through a
medium. Medium accounts for all that is between the observer and the object. Campbell’s notion
of medium shows that perception could be seen in a similar fashion to looking through glass – if
the glass were such that it’s volatile state required constant readjustment and recalibration in
order for it to be made transparent.33 In addition to the cognitive processing that must take place
there are proximity, lighting, position, orientation, and other elements (e.g. emotion and
attention) that must be properly accounted for – adjusted or recalibrated – in order to have a clear
image of the thing one is attempting to perceive.
Campbell’s three-place relation can account for the way in which the same object can
appear differently at different times or from different standpoints. Depending on one’s
standpoint, the medium through which one perceives is different at different places and times. In
addition to the physical standpoint that Campbell points out, I suggest that there is also a
32
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psychological standpoint from which all observers view the world. It is the notion of
psychological standpoint that accounts for the way in which emotion alters perception. Though
Campbell does not elaborate on the psychological, based on evidence from studies previously
mentioned, one’s psychology clearly acts as a medium. If the medium through which one
perceives must include cognitive processing in any way, surely the cognitive processing must be
considered as a factor of standpoint. And, as with proximity and lighting, if the medium of
emotion and attention is not properly adjusted or recalibrated then perception is altered. As we
have seen, emotion can and does augment what one attends to and what one literally sees.
Perceiving from a position of sadness or anger changes how and what one sees. And, although
not stated explicitly, I would argue that Campbell’s, “notion of a standpoint,” eludes to both
physical and mental perspectives when he states that it, “must encompass more than merely the
position of the observer.”34 As pointed out earlier, evidence from research shows that people who
are stressed tend to see things more narrowly whereas those experiencing positive emotions see
things more broadly: the forest or the trees analogy.35 Taking Campbell’s notion of standpoint
and medium into account makes an exemplary case for psychological standpoint.
There is an intimate relationship between observers and objects in the world such that the
qualitative character of a visual experience just is the phenomenal character of objects and
properties viewed. Campbell’s Relational View of Experience points out, “without the objects,
there would be no experience of objects.”36 This point will be better explained in the following
section on Gibson.
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Gibson’s Theory of Direct Perception
James J. Gibson, a renowned psychologist, advances a theory of perception that avoids
the difficulties of sensation-based theories like representationalism. His information-based theory
of perception does not depend on sensations or images to have knowledge of the external world.
Vision, and thus perception, is a circular process that takes place as a complete operation of the
retino-neuro-muscular system and not as a one-way delivery of images to the brain; it involves a
“cycle of action from retina to brain to eye to retina again.”37 Perception is merely a process of
gathering information from ambient light reflecting off surfaces in the world.
Gibson accounts for four assumptions to establish his theory of direct perception: “(1)
the existence of stimulus information, (2) the fact of invariance over time, (3) the process of
extracting invariants over time, and (4) the continuity of perception with memory and thought.”38
Light provides stimulus information to our eyes that tells us how things look from our
perspective, we learn what things are by witnessing the differences between those things that
change and those that do not, and those perceptions get stored with encoded information to be
recalled at a later time and re-experienced.
In order to correctly understand direct visual perception, one requires the facts of
ecological optics. Visual perception requires an array of ambient light; no vision is possible in
darkness and homogenous light causes vision to fail.39 Light, given its speed, obtains equilibrium
in a medium almost immediately.40 We, therefore, do not receive sensations to be processed in
the brain. Rather, we receive information in light from the surfaces of objects that is made
37
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available to us by the light reverberating off of those surfaces when we look. At any point in a
medium there will exist a bundle of visual solid angles corresponding to components or parts of
the illuminated environment.41 Approaching a flight a stairs and preparing to descend seems to
offer an excellent characterization of this point. In a well lit environment the information
provided allows one to approach and descend with relative ease. However, in a poorly lit
environment the stairs become increasingly difficult to navigate.
Though Gibson does not mention a three-place relation, he clearly acknowledges
standpoint. He takes for granted and clearly states that we view the world as it is from a
particular place and time. A characterization of striking importance is that this theory of direct
perception suggests that time is incorporated in the information gathered from the environment.
Direct perception, as Gibson explains, is a process of gathering information from ambient light
reflecting off surfaces in the world. Gibson’s and Campbell’s notion of medium, combined with
Gibson’s understanding that “perception and memory are not sharply separated, either logically
or phenomenally,”42 supports Husserl’s notion of an encoded process that allows one to reprocess that past. If what we perceive is encoded information – gathered from light reflecting off
of services at a place, at a time, from a perspective, though a medium – it makes sense that one’s
memories are likewise encoded. In the same way that remembering a summer beach trip brings
to mind the process of stepping onto the sand, walking into the ocean, smelling the salty breeze,
feeling the warmth of the sun, etc.; a process memory for a PTSD sufferer has the same sorts of
encoded information. What’s more important for PTSD sufferers is that the information is not
pleasant and can trigger a response that may not be suitable given the sufferer’s present location
and situation.
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Gibson also suggests that perception is individualized. Different people see things in
slightly different ways for various reasons, as pointed out in previous sections. Yet we can all
identify objects with a striking degree of accuracy. The reason we all see things similarly (aside
from various ways in which one’s perception might be augmented) is because the things in the
world are what they are and ambient light bounces off their surfaces in the same way for each
viewer; a tree is a tree is a tree. How we perceive them, however, as a product of augmented
perception or our qualitative assessment, is specific to the individual. Certain traumatized
individuals may envision a row of trees as gallows without being delusional to the fact that they
visually perceive trees.

The Power of Combining Campbell and Gibson
There seems to be no point on which Campbell and Gibson conflict. Their theories
converge to support and solidify not only the theoretical philosophical position for direct realism
but the scientifically supported position of direct perception as well. Ambient light reflects off of
surfaces and carries a wealth of information – distance, the absorption frequency of surfaces
(color), texture, and much else – through a medium and stimulates the retino-neuro-muscular
system, which processes and stores the information based on one’s physical and psychological
standpoint.
It has been stated by many that one of the strengths of direct realism as a theory is that it
draws its standards for truth and justification from reality. In short, ‘I see a tree because there is a
tree.’ As appealing and simplistic as the statement may be, it leaves room for challenges. With
the aid of Gibson and Campbell, however, it can be greatly supported. The reason a normal
sighted person can see a tree (taking for granted the generally accepted naming of the object) is
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because there is an object such that light reflects off of its surfaces in such a way as to make it
possible for a normal sighted person to see the object, given a relevant standpoint and permeable
medium.
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CHAPTER 6

POSSIBLE OBJECTION AND RESPONSE

Blindsight, the condition whereby subjects are able to interact with objects that they
effectively cannot see, is a common area of contention for many perceptual theorists. I suggest
that the clinical condition of blindsight is directly related to the type of perception that occurs
when objects are observed peripherally, albeit unattended – I call this the Problem of the
Unattended. Just like for blindsighters, objects are in the environment and not obstructed from
view, but as they are not attended to they are not reportable. This problem appears to address the
core issues faced by PTSD sufferers and is therefore an excellent challenge. I will first show how
Blindsight and the Problem of the Unattended are related and then show that direct perception
withstands the challenge and offers greater insight into understanding the problem.

Problem – Unattended (Blind) Perception
Blindsight is a visual anomaly resulting from cortical blindness due to lesions on the
striate cortex that has the unusual effect of allowing subjects to respond to stimuli of which they
seem not to be consciously aware. Subjects who exhibit cortical blindness are able to pick out
visual targets though they deny seeing them; they are neither aware of what their eyes are taking

28

in nor what their brains process.43 There appears to be a breakdown in the transmittal of
information from one area of the brain to another.
Normal sighted individuals experience something similar but rarely if ever know about it,
though for those who suffer from PTSD it has major ramifications – The Problem of the
Unattended. There are objects in our visual field that are perceived yet not attended to –
unattended perception. These objects, though ambient light bounces off their surfaces to
stimulate the retina and convey information, since they are not attended to they are effectively
not seen. And, though no lesions are present in the brain, the proximity of the objects and the
lack of attention paid to them leave the individual unable to report them, as certain objects are to
blindsighters.
Consider the case of a PTSD sufferer (Alex) whose traumatic event, like all events,
consisted of both perceptually attended items as well as items that were present though were not
actively attended to. Alex, while walking down the street in a place and time unrelated in any
way to her previous traumatic event and not experiencing any related items that were actively
attended to at the moment of the traumatic event, passes by a square piece of paper on the
ground, which she also does not attend to in the present moment. For all intent purposes she does
not ‘see’ it although it is in her peripheral purview such that information about it is conveyed to
her retina. Unbeknownst to Alex, the square piece of paper (notecard or similar square, white
object) on the ground is similar (if not identical) to an object that was on the ground at the
moment of or the moment prior to her traumatic event. Having not actively attended to the object
at the moment of the traumatic event and not actively attending to it at the present moment, Alex
is not consciously aware of the reason why she is suddenly propelled into a seemingly
unprovoked and unwarranted reactive emotional state. Furthermore, her perception of the world
43
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is altered by the emotional state such that she feels the presence of things and people who are not
there, similar to being in the moment of the traumatic event. There is no cognitive cause that
Alex is aware of yet she is presently in an altered emotional and perceptual state. This would
suggest that even though the object was not actively attended to, ambient light conveyed
information from the physical object in the world to Alex and that her cognitive processing of
that information facilitated the altered states in Alex.
The scenario seems apparent when one considers thoughts on which one reflects, but not
so much when it involves physical objects to which one does not actively attend. How might this
be possible? If, as indirect theories like representationalism suggest, perception only occurs in
the brain and objects merely cause the sensations that lead to perception, it seems difficult to
suggest that an unattended object, like an object to a blindsight subject that one is neither aware
of seeing nor aware that their brain has processed, could cause the emotional changes that Alex
experiences after passing the unattended object.

Solution – Obtaining Information From the World
On the representationalist view, the assumption is that what is perceived is only the
process in the brain whose only information is of neural inputs in the brain that somehow are
caused by things in the world. This implies that Alex’s mental state is a result of Alex’s mental
state, which is caused by things in the world though Alex has no ability to directly experience or
perceive them. Accepting a different theory of perception should shed some light on the
situation.
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It seems more likely and more aptly explains the above scenario that what we perceive is
not neuronal processing but information44 from the world, which comes to us through a medium.
The retino-neuro-muscular system is a circular process that relies on retinal inputs that lead to
ocular adjustments that lead to altered retinal inputs, etc., etc., not a straightforward delivery of
images to the brain.45 However, if we accept that through direct perception ambient light conveys
information to the retina that is processed by the brain, which then conveys adjustment
information back to the eye, while simultaneously triggering a state of alertness, the response
Alex has to the unattended object is adequately explained.
There was only the physical object that reflected light that conveyed information to
which the observer did not attend. Nevertheless the information was conveyed. This also lends
itself to explaining how in normal situations a normal sighted person cannot not see an object
that is held up before them. Regardless of whether or not the observer attends to the object in
their purview, the information is conveyed.
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CHAPTER 7

IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT OF PTSD

Understanding experiences like those had by Alex (§6.1.) places the issue in a context
that is more than unmitigated wrong thinking. Plainly stated, many PTSD sufferers feel that they
are the problem in a seemingly normal world and that sort of thinking is unsurprisingly selfdestructive. One can deal with and adapt to a problematic world but there seems to be no
effective way to overcome or cope with a problematic way of thinking in and of itself.
Accepting a direct realist theory of perception might have beneficial implications in
fostering a more productive understanding for how PTSD sufferers view the world, which might
in-turn facilitate a more conscientious approach to their treatment. It is reasonable to suggest that
having the traumatized person view their problems as being based in something external rather
than completely internal could have, if nothing more, the benefit of transferring the problem
from the sufferer to the experience itself. There seem to be important implications for
epistemology as well.
Indirect theories have the negative result of placing the problem squarely in the mind of
the sufferer. It is more helpful and correct to acknowledge that the mind is merely responding to
the encoded information it has been provided. Situational trauma is processed relative to an
individual’s previous experiences. As one experiences trauma over time their notion of normal,
as a position on the Sliding Scale, adjusts. There are times when the experience is too great, too
32

sudden, or too prolonged for the experiencer to smoothly adjust, rendering an unfavorable and
sometimes intolerable psychological state. One such state is that of PTSD.
PTSD has been acknowledged as a widespread issue throughout the world and treatment
for PTSD, specifically psychotherapy or counseling, has improved greatly in recent years. Still, a
report published by CNN in 2013 stated, “Every day, 22 veterans take their own lives,” and
suggested that the number was likely much higher.46 Today, in 2016, the trend continues. An
altered worldview that accepts direct realism could have far-reaching implications, the least of
which would be to realize that decreasing the length of time soldiers are exposed to lifethreatening, impending trauma would have direct and diminishing effects on the aforementioned
trend.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper has been to argue that direct realism is a more adequate and
acceptable theory of perception given the evidence from research and the phenomenological
experiences associated with PTSD. Information from ambient light reflecting off of surfaces is
collected and processed through the retino-neuro-muscular system in a manner of constant
adjustment between the retina, the brain, and the eye. Accepting this direct perceptual theory
allows for a more adequate interpretation of how experiences store information that can be
processed at a later time as memories or, in the case of PTSD, as symptomatic reactions.
Sufferers of PTSD do not experience the past as present in a representational way rather they
have a symptomatic response to stored information. It is my hope that accepting this theory will
advocate for greater acceptance of an altered worldview for PTSD sufferers based on encoded
information provided to them from the environment and that conscientious treatment
acknowledge a Sliding Scale of Perceptual Normalcy will result.
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